Taxi and its importance in the current age.

A fundamental distinction in types of heathrow airport taxi transfers regulations is between quantity regulation, quality regulation and market conduct regulation. Quality regulation embraces the standard of vehicles, driver and operator; this type of regulation is more a safety regulation than a competitiveness one. Market conduct regulation includes rules regarding pick up of passengers, or affiliation to a radio network. Quantity regulations include price regulation and entry restriction. From now and on, the term regulation will refer to quantity regulation. Restrictions on entry to the taxi market have been applied by many cities around the world, but actually many cities are deregulating their markets. The most common justifications used for controlling the entrance to the taxi market are the protection of the taxi drivers incomes and the externalities (pollution and congestion) caused by the circulating taxis, but when decisions are taken without a good justification or implementation plan, entry restrictions and fare regulations are distorting economically the heathrow airport to cambridge transfers sector, leading to important welfare losses. As a result of entry control, the price of the licenses in markets where taxi licenses are tradeable are higher (Paris 125.000 €, Sydney 300.000 $, Melbourne 500.000$, New York 600.000$ [OECD 2007]), and they are rising up constantly due to the exploitation of their owners. Reforms have often been opposed to reduce the incomes of drivers, which are normally low, and restrictive conditions have been applied in this direction, but there is no evidence that taxi incomes are higher in markets with regulated entry conditions. Oppositely, license owners is the group who is being beneficiated by these measures, and not the drivers (Melbourne, as commented above has taxi licenses valuated in 500.000$, but driver incomes are estimated at 8 – 14$ per hour [OECD 2007]). Deregulation has most of the times positive impacts, resulting in lower waiting times, increased consumer satisfaction and price falling (OECD 2007). Market liberalization is an interesting challenge for many cities, but in cities where strong supply restrictions have been applied, there will be a strong opposition to reform proposals from the license-owners. Arguments support that license-owners must be compensated in that case: one approach (first used in Ireland) is to give the additional licenses to each license-owner, ensuring that the new monopoly will remain in their hands; alternatively the new license can be given to taxi drivers without taxi license (OECD 2007). In Melbourne, a 12 year program is adding to the stock of licenses a number of licenses equal to the yearly demand growth. Other concepts are important in relation to deregulation, most of the times quantity deregulation means quality regulation, ensuring safety and minimum service standards. The paper is structured as follows: the second chapter presents the taxi market, describing the operational modes. The third chapter resumes the different models presented in the literature, from the aggregated models until the equilibrium models. The next chapter highlights the most important ideas and results from the literature review, analyzing the operational modes, the market equilibrium and the regulation of the taxicab markets. The fifth chapter presents an overview of the taxi markets in different cities around the world, resuming the deregulation consequences observed in the deregulated markets. Finally, the last chapter contains the conclusions obtained from the literature and state of the practice review and proposes the development of a new model for the study of the heathrow airport to oxford transfers market.

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